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I INTRODT ' CTION 
The focus of this paper is the status (if any) the "de facto" 
relationship ought to be accorded in New Zealand law. Not only is it 
necessary to discuss which relationships merit legal recognition, bLt 
also why they merit it, the extent of that recognition and the means 
by which it should be implemented. 
The first step in such an analysis is inevitably to examine 
the law at present. How is "de facto" defined and is this adequate in 
terms of both clarity and policy? Furthermore, how realistic is the 
treatment of these relationships once the label of "de facto" has been 
attached? Having laid the ground work of law, how does this interrelate 
with the Human Rights Commission Act 1977. The Human Rights Commission 
is at present working on a report clarifying the definition of 
"marital status" within the Act. Although no decision has as yet 
been released this paper will offer opinions as to the appropriate 
interpretation. Generally the ramifications of a de c ision to either 
include or exclude the de facto relationship will be discussed. The 
submissions to the select committee on the Bill shed some light in 
this area, while serving as an introduction to the general policy 
considerations that must be taken into account if conferring legal 
status on an extra-legal union. Finally, the area of reform warrants 
discussion. If legal cover is to be extended wh~t is the mqst 
appropriate means by which to achieve it i.e. by stat L• te ,, or by 
judicial recognition? How far and into what areas shQuid it extend? 
Inevitably all inquiries form the one central iss ue . ., 
Should de facto relationships receive legal recognition at all ? ,, 
If so, which ones, in what areas, and by what means? 
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II DEFINITION AND TREATMENT OF THE DE FACTO RELATIONSHIP AT PRESENT 
A. Definition 
Such is the complexity of human relationships that it is 
extremely difficult to draw the line at any one point, marking it as 
the beginning of a "de facto" relationship. (It should be noted at 
this point that the paper precedes on the ass L1mption that hetero-
sexual unions are the only ones under consideration. While the status 
of homosexual relationships are worthy of consideration also, it is 
a topic in itself, and as such a deep study outside the scope of this 
paper). At the most vague there is the one night sexual encounter of 
two persons, a situation to which (in the absence of a paternity claim) 
no one would seriously attempt to attach legal rights. At the other 
end of the scale is the long term live-in relationship that bears all 
the traditional characteristics of marriage without the legal or 
religious solemniza'ti.on, a clear de facto marriage. Meanwhile, in 
between, there could be a sexually intense union that involves lengthy 
periods of staying over but no joint home, or conversely a joint home 
run on virtual flatmate lines. There are also great variations in 
the length of relationships. It follows that if the non married couple 
is to be accorded some type of legal status a consistent definition is 
required. It is submitted that in the absence of such a definition 
couples are too much at the whim of individual decision makers. As 
always it is a matter of balancing the competing demands of certainty 
and flexibility. 
Of the recognition that is at present implemented, what 
types of relationships are incl uded? Firstly, the limited 
rights and obligations embodied in N.Z. statute (fully discussed in 
part B) provide some definition. For example, to collect Government 
Superannuation spouse inc ludes "any man or woman, whom the Board, in 
its discretion, regards as being the wife or husband of that person 
1 immediately before the person's death". In regard to national 
superannuation the So r ial Security Amendment Act 1978 defines spouse 
as the "husband or wife of an applicant or beneficiary as the context 
-3-
2 
may require", a particularly ambiguous piece of wording. To be 
deprived of a sickness or domestic purposes benefit under s.63(b) 
of the Social Security Act 1964 one must have "entered into a relation-
ship in the nature of marriage although not legally married 
Originally the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 included, in its early 
stages, a definition of "marital status" that covered "de facto 
marriages" while the Matrimonial Property Bill 1975 in certain cases 
included de facto spouses if the parties had lived as husband and 
4 wife for not less than two years. 
In short statute seems to require a relationship similar to 
marriage, without specifying precisely what that entails. Therefore, 
in assessing what falls into this somewhat vague category it is not 
illogical that the courts tend to apply the traditional tests for 
formulated for marriage.
5 
In adopting this "marriage like" test the 
N.Z. legislature is much in deeping with the overseas example. Some 
British statutory definitions are "two persons cohabiting as husband 
and wife" 
6 
"live with him as his wife" 7 "a man and woman who are ' ' 
living with each other in the same household as husband and wife". 
8 
One noticeable feature is that the British statutes place much more 
emphasis on the fact of cohabitation, a requirement that could prove 
far more rigid than the somewhat vague H•.Z counterparts. 
The courts are nevertheless called upon to adjudicate 
cases both pursuant to and independent of statute. As was previously 
pointed out, in interpreting a statutory test that requires "husband 
and wife" status. The court has to adopt a virtual test of marriage. 
9 A prime example of this is the well publi c ised case of Furmage v. S.S. C. 
To establish what was "living together on a domestic basis" they 
adopted tests from a case where the couple were legally marriedlO 
su ch as level of commitment, holding out, intention, external 
evidence of sharing life, sexual content etc. Inevitably that 
particular inclusion failed because "domestic basis" was held in 
the Supreme Gourt (after s.27a 1978 Amendment) to demand a common 
roof, but the fact remains that statute as upheld by common law 
requires a high as near as possible to marriage like standard. 
' . ' 
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Is this standard then reflected in cases not arising out of 
a previously defined status? Not necessarily so. At the risk of being 
cynical, the courts can, if they wish, grant a remedy to any relation-
ship they think worthy of it. However, that does not mean that 
there is not a framework of criteria in to which to fit individual 
circumstances. Zuckerman claims the courts assess "the understanding 
and common intention regarding mutual rights.
11 
However as he points 
out, such a subjective test is notoriously slippery and thus weight 
must be put on objective factors such as the degree of integration of 
economic, domestic, and social affairs, mutual commitment, its 
sexual or platonic nature, the duration of the relationship, the 
presence of children etc. 'Zuckerman sums it up as "agreement and 
reliance". Still, it is an extremely wide test, very much capable 
of adaption to the piecemeal justice of the courts. One thing that 
does emerge from an examination of case law is the changing 
attitude of the courts over the years. Whereas in 1950 an English 
court held that a man who had lived with a woman for twenty years was 
not a member of the "family" for statutory tenancy purposes, 
12 
in 
1975 James L.J. in Dyse.n Holdings Ltd v. Fox 
13 
said that relation-
ship would now be encompassed in the word family. He was also 
careful to distinguish "relationships of a casual or intermittent 
14 character and those bearing indications of permanence. It is fair 
to say that now a days an extra marital relationship, so long as it 
is of a high level of commitment will be deemed "de facto". In cases 
of judicial discretion there is obviously more scope to include 
relationships that would not normally be included in a statutory 
definition of marriage-like (or something similar) and this is 
evidenced by remedies in the "mistress" cases. 
15 
However, in general 
the courts are inclined to follow legislative example and demand 
that marriage lime commitment. 
I< 
The final point is one of which standard is the correct 
one. It is fair, it is submitted, to generally require a level of 
commitment similar to marriage. It has commonly been said that if 
this is the requirement why is marriage itself not the ac ceptable 
criterion? Quite simply, there are many reasons why couples choose 
" 
3 
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not to marry, and it is fallacious, it is submitted, to brand a 
relationship as having less commitment than marriage merely because it 
has not been legitimised. When marriage is made the criterion it is 
no longer commitment alone that is being gauged, but the expression 
of that commitment as determined by social background, marital and 
other personal circumstance etcetera. However, the fact remains 
that at the moment ther is no satisfactory means of testing relation-
ships. Judicial discretion, while admitting deserving cases that 
might normally be excluded, provides too little certainty. A further 
problem is that while statutory definitions are vaguely worded the 
judiciary must decide those cases as well as those that arise independ-
ently out of common law and equitable actions (although that is not 
so much de c iding whether a relationship has a certain label, but 
rather whether it warrants remedy or not). Yet another point is that 
depending on the area of law involved, justice may require a different 
standard i.e. in deciding whether to withdraw a benefit, it is 
suggested that more emphasis should be placed on the financial aspects 
of the relationship, than if one is deciding whether or not to grant 
a loan, where the permanence of the relati onship might be a more 
appropriate focus of inquiry. (further discussion of this point is 
contained in chapter V when a draft definition is discussed) 
In conclusion, therefore, the problem is one of providing 
certainty of inclusion and thus protection for those who wish it, 
without standardising the test to the extent that others will 
automatically be exc luded. An obvious example of this would be to 
legislate a "de facto spouse" on the lines of the South Australian 
· 16 h · 1 · · . . h pntative spouse. However , w en time imits or a criterien sue .,. 
as the birth of childeren are introduced automatic exclusion 
becomes a great difficulty. Furthermore, how is the definition to 
be tailored to meet the needs of each separate area of law? 
z 
0 
2 
" 
3 
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B. Present Legal Recognition of De Facto Relationships 
1. Statutory inclusion 
Once it is assumed that a couple has already met the 
requirements of definition there are a limited number of statutes 
which grant rights or impose obligations available to married 
couples. The Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 provides 
for claims against an estate for services rendered where an express 
17 or implied promise for remuneration can be proved. One case 
states that a de facto relationship will not defeat a claim, nor 
will services beyond normal be expected. Both superannuations 
recognise the de facto spouse when paying the married rate (which 
it might be added is less than two single grants), and a domestic 
purposes benefit will be withdrawn if a de facto relationship is 
proved. 
18 
Under Accident Compensation both earnings related 
· 
19 
d 1 
20 
1 1 h d compensation an ump sums are avai ab e tote depen ent 
de facto spouse, Under the soon to be out-dated Domestic Proceedings 
Act 1968
21 
and the new Family Proceedings Act 1980
22 
the unmarried 
father must maintain his child. The Housing Corporation will also 
grant a loan to a de facto couple as part of a non-discriminatory 
policy. 
On the other hand there is a long list of areas where the 
de facto couple/spouse are excluded. In the Family Proceedings Act 
1980 the provisions for reconciliation and conciliation,
23 
11 . 24 d. . 25 t. 26 1 1 t . d counse ing, me iation, separa ion on y app y o marrie 
couples. A de facto couple cannot register their home as a joint 
family home, nor can they adopt children. A de facto spouse cannot 
inherit under the Administration Act 1955 nor claim under the 
Family Protection Act 1955. While child maintenance
27 
is 
available under the Family Proceedings Act 1980 there is no 
provision for the personal and rehabilitative maintenance available 
28 to married/divorced couples. Most importantly a de facto couple 
do not have their property divided on break up in accordance with the 
29 Matrimonial Property Act 1976. Because of this silence as to 
....., 
3 
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de facto property rights, a major area of law has evolved to deal 
with their disputes. 
2. Property rights outside statute 
There is no one approach to the resolution of de facto 
property disputes. Alternative legal concepts have been made 
available whenever a factual situation is vaguely suitable according 
to judicial assessment. In other words this means has been used to 
grant rights within the context of relationships already decided 
upon as deserving (for the purposes of this paper labelled "de facto" 
although, unless decided pursuant to a statutory definition, the 
court will not take a "label and apply remedy" approach). 
(a) The trust 
Originally the position was that a person had no more 
share in property than was equivalent to his/her financial 
contribution. 30 However, today, the party asking for a non-title 
interest must prove the property was acquired by joint efforts for 
joint purposes. The court considers contributions (finance and 
service) and may order the title holder to hold a certain share on 
trust (either constructive or resulting) for the other. The basic 
31 decision is Lord Denning's in Co'?._ke v. Head. In that case a 
couple pooled resources to buy a section. They bought materials 
out of joint resources and both assisted to build the house. 
Unfortunately both the property and the mortgage was in the man's 
name alone. Denning claimed to follow Pettit
32 
and Gissing33 
when he stated that "wherever the parties by joint efforts acquire 
property to use for their joint benefit the courts may impose or 
impute a constructive or resulting trust. 1134 He did not take 
party intention into account, and he valued contributions other 
than financial. The non-title holding woman, in this case, 
received a third share of sale proceeds. 
-8-
The principle was developed in Eves v. Eves.
35 
Although 
the de facto wife had made no financial contribution at all, her 
redecoration and housewifely labours were seen by Denning as 
enough to entitle her to a share. In N.Z.the cases have 
followed the Cooke v. Head reasoning. In Crossfield v. 
36 
Lechtenberger a man brought a c laim for a share in his dead 
de facto spouse's estate. He received a half share because of 
37 joint efforts and some finan c ial contribution. In Frazer v. Gough 
the applicant contributed to the initial cost of properties and 
assisted in improving them. The de facto wife signed two do cuments 
acknowledging the man's half share. Later in court she c laimed 
they were securities for money loaned. In the Supreme Co urt emphasis 
was pla c ed on the joint efforts to a cquire the property for joint 
use, rather than the intent behind the documents. Therefore , he 
received a third share on res u lting trust. However, in the Court of 
Appeal the share was increased to a half as the Court c laimed that 
a documentary share could not be altered. Because of this superior 
judgment one can no longer state that the case was decided on a 
Cooke v. g~ad principle , as the contract element c onfu ses the trust 
issue. 
38 In many cases Cooke v. Head and its line of cases has 
been disputed outright. I f it were commonl y a c cepted that certain 
t ypes of cohabitation automatically give rise to this t ype of 
co-ownership, the de fa c to couple would at least have some 
certainty of property division. However, beca u se the princ iple 
is in disp u te it leaves ~o mu ch power in the hands of individual 
judges , often forcing one member of a de fa c to c ouple to attempt 
a claim in another area of equity, often to miss out altogether. 
One reason for the dispute is that while Lord Denning claimed to 
base his de c ision on princ iples in the earlier cases of ~ ~ssing and 
Pettit, such a base is questionable. yettit a c tually stands for 
the proposition that there will be no c laim by a spouse who expends 
money or does work on someone else's property in the absence of 
an agreement. Gissi~ req u ires a common intention and placed 
" 
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heavy emphasis on financial contribution. Thus a line of cases in 
opposition to Cooke v. Head and claiming to follow the "true" 
39 Pettit and Gissin[ tests exist. Allen v. ~der states that 
a trust must be inferred from matter of fact , not Denning's imputed 
intention. In the N.Z. case of Gibson v. Gibson
40 
the court 
outrightly refused to apply Co~ke v. Head. If this sets a trend 
for further N.Z. cases, the position of the non-title holding 
de facto spouse will be severely threatened. While it is conceivable 
that some relationships will fall within the more stringent test of 
actual intention, it is fair to say that most will lack that degree of 
fPrethought and consequently fail. Of course, it is debatable 
whether the de facto couple should have their property dealings 
specially recognised by law at all (and this will be discussed in 
chapter IV) yet it is submitted that whatever one's view is, a 
degree of certainty over and above this haphazard approach is 
required. Even if New Zealand were to adopt the Cooke v. Head stand, 
the law would still be far from certain. 
Some couples do think to regulate their property rights by 
contract. However there is no guarantee that the law will accept 
it. A significant authority in the area is the American case of 
Marvin v. Marvin~ 1 In that case the woman was a c tuall y granted 
a share on the basis of some vague equitable remedy . However, the 
court in its first decision stated that an express contract would 
be valid unless it had "meretricious sexual services" as consider-
ation or was contrary to public policy for some other reason. Of 
direct relevance is Frazer v. ~ough. Although eventually the 
Court of Appeal upheld a half share on what appeared to be the 
basis of express contract, at Supreme Court level the terms had been 
varied in favour of an independent trust. 
Therefore it seems that while express contracts may be 
upheld in some cases it is equally possible that they could be 
varied or struck down altogether at judicial whim. I t is interesting 
3 
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to note that clause 16 of the Matrimonial Property Bill 1975 (later 
struck out) stated that express cohabitant contracts would not 
be void or illegal as contrary to public policy (always a potential 
danger for the de facto relationship even in today's supposed 
permissive society)
42
. Prima facie de facto rights would have been 
upheld. Yet clause 16 was still subject to clause 49 (also struck 
out)which meant the court could make an order, if in their opinion 
it was "fair" to do so, which altered or struck down the contract. 
While it recognised that moral objections were misplaced in consider-
ing the validity of a contract the de facto couple (just as the 
married couple in section 21 of the Act) were not fully free to 
regulate their property rights because of potential inequality of 
bargaining power etcetera. For these reasons the ultimate power 
of the court to alter or strike down for reasons other than public 
policy was probably necessary. Unfortunately, the law as it stands 
has no such limitation. A court can strike down such a contract 
for public policy reasons as it thinks fit, thus robbing the de facto 
43 
couple of certainty once more. It may be asked why this move was 
taken. Both politicians and public feel a certain moral repugnance 
at de facto relationships being placed on the same level as the legal 
. 44 
marriage. For this reason, and the view that failure to marry 
implies a reluctance to shoulder the "obligations and incidents 
of marriage" it is not difficult to understand why clause 49 was 
removed from a matrimonial property regime. However it is more 
illogical to justify the striking out of clause 16. Some clue 
as to this is perhaps provided by the Angelo and Atkin submission 
to the Select Committee on the Matrimonial Property Bill 1975. 
They write that while "there may indeed be reason for the couples 
to have the freedom to regulate their affairs as they wish ... 
it is conceptually inappropriate for this provision to appear 
in this Act, particularly if the strains of marriage is one to which 
h d · 1 · . 1145 Th. . f . . testate accor s a specia position. is view o inappropriate-
ness is not shared by the writer, but even so, the legislature has 
created a serious gap in law by removing an essentially sound 
provision without providing for its insertion in law elsewhere. 
-11-
(c) Implied contract and estoppel 
Vario u s cases have used these as a vehi c le to dispense 
justice. Marvin as a general rule of thumb, acknowledged the 
validity of implied contract as long as it was not against public 
1 . I T T 46 D · . 1 . d l 1 • po icy. n anner v. anner enning imp ie a contractua icence 
for a woman to have accommodation as long as the children, who were 
fathered by the owner of the property, were of s chool age. 
Her consideration was the surrender of a rent control flat to live 
in her lover's accommodation and the bringing up of the children. 
47 Another successful contractual licence case was Chandler v. Kerly. 
48 However, a notable failure in the area is Horrocks v. Foray. 
A man had set up his long time mistress in an expensive flat. When 
he died the woman claimed it in competition with the estate which 
would be insolvent without it. The Court declined to imply a 
contract on the obvious policy ground regarding the competition 
of legal wife and lover. It serves to illustrate just how tenuous 
~ any of these common law remedies are. They are only available if 
the case is deemed deserving, legal principle being subservient to 
policy , 
Another vehic le, closely related to implied contract is 
t 1 I W·11· St . 49 d W W SO h' es oppe . n i iams v. aite an v. t is concept 
was used to prevent an owner denying the non-title holder rights. 
A classic example is Pascoe v. Turner
51 
where a woman who had 
lived with a man in his house for nine years and to whom he had 
represented that the house was a gift succeeded in her a c tion for 
ownership. The man was estopped from denying ownership on the 
basis that he had acquiesced and encouraged her in that belief. 
Zuckerman
52 
also points out that cases such as Tanner could have 
been decided equally well on estoppel principles. He also points 
out that in some cases contract and estoppel overlap in that the 
undertaking to do or not to do something in the latter is often the 
same as if one had contractually bound oneself , However, he is 
adam~nt that one should always attempt to identify the correct legal 
" 
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principle, based on behaviour intended to create obligation. He 
does not find it satisfactory to examine the relationship and then 
attach a convenient legal principle. 
It is submitted that it is unsound to muddle principles 
and impute intentions, not only because of the mutation of the 
theoretical base that ensueslbut because of the potential for 
imposition of individual justice that it offers the judiciary. While 
it is praiseworthy that individual members of the judiciary should 
attempt to alter what is often an inequitable situation , the necessity 
for this uncertain and arbitrary system of remedies would be 
removed if de facto relationships had their own legal regime. Its 
introduction would ensure that problems would be dealt with by a 
system that was tailored to meet de facto needs rather than forced 
into the basically unsuitable existing framework. 
III. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION ACT 1977 
Throughout the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 there are 
numerous references to the fact that there shall be no discrimination 
on the grounds (among other things) of "marital status". However, 
in section 2 there is no definition of which relationships are 
included within this. This is in contrast to the 1976 Bill which 
included a definition of a "de facto marriage". What is one to 
conclude from this alteration and what would an inclusion or exclusion 
mean for de facto couples everywhere? 
A. Semantics And Logic 
The fact that the Bill included a definition encompassing 
de facto while the Act excludes any definition at all could be taken 
to indicate a change of mind i.e. that de facto was no longer 
intended to be included and only the obvious statuses remained i.e. 
single,married, divorced, separated. However, it is submitted, 
that would only have been the case had a new definition excluding 
-13-
"de facto marriage" been inserted (i.e. it could just as well be 
said that none of the other statuses were meant to be included 
either. De facto is in no way singled out). What this appears 
to be is an abdication of responsiblity on the part of the legis-
lature because of the very failure to further define. It has 
been left for further decision and thus the Human Rights Commission 
is now looking into the matter. 
There are strong arguments for both interpretations. On 
the side of exclusion is the suggestion that one's marital status 
is not "de facto" but single, divorced, married or separated. In 
other words to allow de facto marriage to be a status in itself would 
be to give all those people two statuses, virtually robbing the 
others of meaning (unless they become single and not de facto, 
divorced and ncif de facto etc.). Arguments along these lines say 
that the word "marital" exclusively refers to the status of either being 
married or not being married, or having been married once. A de 
facto relationship is something entirely independent of this, just 
as being single but a homosexual relates to one's domestic 
arrangements rather than marital status o Of course, the extreme 
result of this point of view would be to claim "marital status" 
refers solely to the state of being married, thus providing 
legislation that prevents discrimination against married couples o 
However, it is submitted that both semantics and logic are 
against adoption of that most narrow interpretation. If this 
were so many application forms would have to alter by the 
addition of a question mark the usual inquiry, as to which 
marital status the applicant came within (i.e. "marital status"? 
meaning married or not)o Apart from common usuage it seems inconsis-
tent with the spirit of the Act to only protect married couples. 
The argument for inclusion claims that "marital status" 
encompasses any living arrangement and that being party to a de 
facto marriage automatically excludes one from the single, 
divorced or separated and married category (countering the argument 
that one,in fact, has two statuses). In furtherance of this 
3 
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view, suppose a woman applies for a position as a primary school 
teacher. However, when the Board of Governors discover that she, 
in fact, lives in a de facto marriage, they inform her that she is 
unsuitable to teach young children because of her "immorality". 
In that case one would clearly say that she had been discriminated 
against because of her "marital status" which they took to be 
"de facto" rather than single. There is no evidence of "immorality" 
other than that she is not married to the man with whom she lives. 
Surely if persons can suffer discrimination for no other reason 
than that they choose to live a certain way it should be a "marital 
status" within the meaning of the Ac t? It is out of touch with 
logic to deny status to a lifestyle that is so often subject to 
dis crimination. 
It is the opinion of the writer that the latter interpret-
ation should prevail. While exclusion may have a stranger base 
""PP &-r- t semantically, logic and practice ~ the wider view. It might 
also be added that to deny protection to unmarried couples appears 
inconsistent with the spirit of the Act. The long title states, 
t h~ YJ 1 
afterall that it is to"promote the advancement..-rights in New 
Zealand II • 0 0 e The writer finds it hard to believe that de facto 
couples have no such rights. 
B. The Overseas Example 
Pursuant to statutory provisions in New {South Wales, 
53 
V. . 
54 S h A 1 · 55 d d. . T . 5 6 · · ictoria, out ustra ia an pen ing in asmania, it is 
illegal in certain circumstances to discriminate upon the basis of 
"marital status." In all except Victoria, which excludes a 
reference to unmarried cohabitation, the definition includes de 
facto relationships with wording very similar to the New South 
Wales Anti Discrimination Act 1977 which states "marital 
status" includes the "cohabitation, otherwise than in marriage, 
. h f h . 115 7 wit a person o t e opposite sex. 
3 
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At the other end of the interpretation scale, in Britain, 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 bans discrimination on the basis of 
"marital status" in some areas, but its definition 
58 
does not 
apply to the state of being unmarried. In other words it takes on 
the narrowest possible interpretation of preventing discrimination 
only against people whose injustice arises from the fact that 
they are married. 
Finally in the United States "marital status" in certain 
cases is an illegal ground of discrimination in the Civil Rights Act 
1964. However, like New Zealand the term is not defined in statute 
and the judiciary inevitably has to clear up the ambiguity. While 
there appears to be no direct authority for the proposition that 
unmarried cohabitation is included within "marital status" there 
are some indirect indications. Take for example, the area of 
employment, set out in Title VII to the Civil Rights Act 1964, in 
which it is not illegal to discriminate on the basis of "marital 
status" as such. As a result airlines have instituted a "no 
spouse" rule which means a married couple cannot work together on 
59 the same aeroplane. In one case it was held that this restrict-
ion could also apply to unmarried couples. While this is a negative 
example, it is surely not unrealistic to expect that if "marital 
status" had been included as illegal, that sqme unmarried couple 
would have been within the protective definition? In other 
words the only factor that could legally disrupt their employment was 
their marital status, which in the case of the unmarried couple 
was deemed to be something other than single. Likewise in certain 
American states, it is still possible to dismiss teachers on the 
grounds of their "immoral" cohabitation alone. 60 If "marital 
status'' is the only allowable ground for such a decision then the 
de facto relationship appears to have been indirectly labelled as such 
(i.e. if the only reason for dismissal is the fact of unmarried 
cohabitation it would be illegal if it were not for the fact that 
"marital status" is an allowed grounds for discrimination in the 
employment area. Does that not then make unmarried cohabitation 
a "marital status"?). 
3 
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Incidentally the U.S. courts in order to combat "marital 
status" discrimination tend to view it as an aspect of sex dis-
crimination (outlawed) in that it allows disparate practices among 
men and women (i.e. it is us ually the woman in such a relationship 
that is labelled immoral). It is this rationale that allowed the 
married stewardesses who used to be grounded on their marriage 
(a clear case of discrimination because of their married status) 
claim sexual discrimination because male staff were not subject 
61 the same rule. 
In conclusion, while U.S . law cannot provide a clear 
to 
to 
example of the de facto relationship included within the "marital 
status" definition (i.e. it has no such definition) it provides 
instances where discrimination on the grounds of a de facto relationship 
has been allowed in an area where the only possible legal 
justification for this is the grounds of "marital status". 
C. The Ramifications of Definition 
It is first of use to summarise where "marital status" 
is a prohibited ground of discrimination in New Zealand .;ni ~ 
Human Rights Commission Act 1977 the areas so covered are employment, 
partnerships, unions and trade associations, qualifying bodies, 
vocational training bodie s, access to public pla ces, provision 
of goods and services, accommodation, and education . ( Contrast 
this with Tasmania which only extends this to employment and 
supply of goods, 62 New South Wales which includes these two plus 
accommodation, 63 and Victoria 64 and South Australia 65 which have 
these three plus education. In Britain this ground only extends 
66 to employment ) What becomes apparent is that a considerable 
area of New Zealand law is involved and thus de facto rights face 
either a corresponding setback or step forward. 
If the Human Rights Commission decides that the "de facto" 
marriage is outside the term the position is obvious. In none of 
~ 
~ 
-,: 
-r 
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the specified areas will the unmarried couple have any redress for 
discrimination. What is more the "spirit" of such exclusion cannot 
but help permeate other areas of life. For instance, on the strength 
of "marital status" being included in the Act, the Housing Corporation 
67 altered its policy so as to allow loans to unmarried couples. 
Strictly speaking they did nothave to (as marital status was not 
defined) but behaved in accordance with what they felt was the tenor 
of the Act. If the de facto marriage is to be publicly shunned, 
(which will be the case if the H.R.C. decides it is excluded from 
"marital status") perhaps other doorswill close. 
If the "de facto marriage" is included the main advantage, 
it is submitted will be in granting some degree of respect to it. I 
In practical terms it will not mean that the exclusion of de facto 
couples from the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 is illegal, nor will 
So 
it be to exclude the de facto spouse from the Administration Act 
1968 and Family Protection Act 1955. However section 24 with its 
provision of goods and services includes "fa c ilities by way of 
banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit and finance',' which is 
a substantial breakthrough. Three other major areas are education, 
accommodation and employment. Yet on closer examination it can 
be seen that section 15 (5) . exempts "preferential treatment 
based on sex or marital status where the position requires a 
married couple." This could be the thorn in a few de facto sides. 
Therefore, apart from obvious benefits it would be ~matter 
of recognizing that persons living in a de facto union have the right 
to go through life without obvious barriers thrown in their paths. 
Presumably an inclusion in this central Act would open the way up 
for provision in other legislation -the first step in de stigmati-
zation. It should be noted that as the Act stands with its absence 
of any definition, New Zealand has placed herself in the American 
situation. Each reference to marital status could presumably be 
defined separately according to the subject it related to . Such 
a haphazard process with its heavy reliance on judicial discretion 
is far from desirable, it is submitted. 
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D. Submissions On Definition 
AS an introduction to the next section (which deals with 
the broad policy overview of the legal recognition of de facto 
relationships) it is helpful to take a look at the public submissions 
on the Bill, which it should be noted, defined "marital status" 
so as to include "de facto marriage". The submissions fall into 
two main categories. Firstly those expressing an opinion as to the 
inclusion in general, and secondly those concerned with the omission 
of "de facto" from the term, in relation to accommodation in ·clause.. 
23(5) . These submissions are important as being representative of 
public opinion. It is submitted that a piece of law must have some 
relation to what "the people" want. 
Statistically, of the twenty seven submissions on this 
point that the writer examined (there may possibly be a few brief 
references overlooked) only three expressed general abhorrence at 
the concept of the de facto status being granted legal status . The 
first was the society for the Protection of Community Standards . 
Another was a private citizen, who felt that "this state of immorality 
is given official sanction This represents a blow against the 
sanctity of marriage, the stability of the family, and hence of 
society." Patricia Bqrt]..ett, as spokesperson for S.P.C.S. stated 
that Parliament was stating its approval of de facto relationships 
outside marriage . She connected these relationships with increasing 
marriage breakdown and concluded with this statement: 
It will be a decadent day for New Zealand 
if Government permits this definition to 
remain. 
The third was a church group (the Gospel Radio Fellowship) who 
felt that a stable society rested on marriage ordained by God and 
thus contested the definition. It seems therefore, that only a 
small percentage of New Zealanders were prepared to admit to 
suffering moral outrage at the definition. Neither of the three, 
...., 
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it should be noted, challenged the inclusion on semantic grounds 
which the writer was informed was the real reason for the retraction. 68 
Of the four other groups who expressed some sort of dis-
approval, three were concerned with the preactical difficulties of 
administering benefits. The New Zealand Society of Actuaries 
queried how one was to define a de facto -widow, for example, in 
paying a widow's benefit. The Association of Superannuation Funds 
of New Zealand Ltd pointed out the practical and financial difficulties 
in paying death and retirement benefits to these extra people. A 
combined religious group wanted housing loan preference to married 
couple& On the employment front the Presbyterian Social Services 
Association thought some jobs demanded a special type of person 
as reflected by their marital status. They were anxious to point 
out it was matter of integrity not morality. Basically all four 
only wanted special exemptions in their area of concern, and were not 
expressing general antagonism. 
The twenty remaining submissions either expressly or 
implicitly (by criticism of clause 23(5) which exempted de factos 
from protection from discrimination in accommodation) lauded the 
definition. While there is much repetition of reasoning the follow-
ing is a sample of each of the main policy arguments to emerge : 
1. The New Zealand Maori Women's Welfare League and the 
Commission of Women both point out that certain minority groups in 
New Zealand (Maoris and presumably some Island groups) customarily 
live together without benefit of marriage and to exclude them from 
protection would be to seriously disadvantage a section of the New 
Zealand population. 
2. Exclusion is inconsistent with current law, in letter 
and in spirit. The National Council of New Zealand Women point out 
that as the Cabinet Committee on Family define "family" to include 
"de facto", would an exclusion reflect a change in attitude? 
(This referred to clavse 23 (5) exclusion . The New Zealand Maori 
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Women's Welfare League query how one can justify an exclusion of 
de facto rights (clause 23(5)) in light of other areas that include 
them, particularly the denial of the domestic purposes benefit 
(i.e., why should recognition of de facto only work to their 
detriment?). Many other groups generally claimed that any limitation 
on de facto rights was inconsistent with the spirit of the entire 
bill i.e. to promote the advancement of human rights in New Zealand etc. 
3. Several submissions pointed out that to discriminate 
or differentiate between the rights of married and unmarried couples 
was to unnecessarily prejudice the well being of the innocent 
children involved. 69 
4. The Christchurch Women's Electoral Lobby and the National 
Organisation of Women felt it wrong that people should indirectly 
be encouraged to seek proof of marriage. 
5. A popular claim was that the law had an obligation 
to protect all people,notto legislate society's prejudices. Closely 
related was the idea that the law should move with modern trends 
i.e. de facto relationships existed and consequently must be 
recognized whatever one personally felt about them. 
6. By far the majority of submissions expressed relief 
that at least people were free to live the way they wished and 
that any limitation (i.e. section 23 (5)) could be placed on this 
right.These are the emotive line of arguments. The Broadsheet 
Magazine and Auckland Women's Centre thought it unacceptable that 
"one person's ethical beliefs (in favour of marriage) have more 
validity than those of another . • .. " They also raise the interest-
ing point that if de facto marriage cannot fall within "marital 
status" it is still a breach of "ethical beliefs" protection to 
discriminate on that ground (i . e . someone's belief about the wisdom 
of marrying or not marrying is part of their inherent philosophy 
on life and as such is an ethical belief. Atheism, for instance, 
in a negative outlook that is also an ethical belief, so why is 
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not a non-belief in marriage accorded the same respect, in that it 
cannot be a cause of discrimination). The Halfway House submission 
(perhaps the most extreme on its side) claimed that it was "disgusting 
in the extreme" to punish those who reject "the crippling and 
oppressive institution of marriage". Last say, however, should go 
to the Women's Rights Policy Waking Group of the New Zealand, Values 
Party. In relation to the clause 23(5) exclusion they have this 
to say 
The English common law at the beginning 
of the century decided that even a 
prostitute should have a home.70 
It becomes obvious after examining the submissions that 
the majority of those willing to submit their opinion favour the 
inclusion of "de facto marriage" within the definition, to a 
partial if not total extent. Of course, one could raise the question 
of just how representative these views are when most of those in 
favour are from women's/feminist groups. The answer to this is 
obvious, If only three groups feel strongly enough to oppose the 
move, then the rest of New Zealand either tacitly supports inclusion 
or more than likely does not care either way. If the latter is true, 
why should indifference be seen as a justification for denying 
those who do care and those who are directly affected? Quite simply, 
it should not! 
E. The Parliamentary View 
In an effort to divine further reactions to the proposed 
definition of 11marital status" the writer perused the Hansard reports. 
In general it is fair to say that Parliamentarians presented no view 
on the matter that has not already been canvassed in the submissions 
or in chapter IV. The well worn theme (from Government M.P. 's) 
was that marriage as an institution must be elevated above un-
married cohabitation in law. It was put that it should not be 
considered "that there is no more merit in a legal marriage than in 
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71 two persons living together." The Opposition took a stand not 
all that different. One M.P. stated that de facto relationships 
"all be it sadly" must be recognised. ,.7 2 The main difference was 
that Opposition M.P.s claimed it was a "social phenomenon" that 
must be dealt with. The stance was basically one of reluctant 
practicality. Perhaps most enlightening, however, is the statement 
of the member for Hawkes Bay in presenting the report of the 
Committee. He says: 
Some members considered it inappropriate 
and contradictory to put a de facto on 
all fours with a legal marriage, so the 
term marital status will retain its long 
established meaning of being married or 
single. 73 
This statement leaves no doubt as to what was intended 
by the legislature when the Act finally emerged all definition of 
"marital status" struck out. Although it may be wondered why the 
definition was not retained with the reference to de facto alone 
struck out, there was a clear intention to exclude de facto from 
the meaning, and an intention equally clear to pass the ultimate 
buck of that definition to the Human Rights Commission.
74 
IV. THE POLICY OVERVIEW 
As the arguments for both sides are so many and varied 
it is best to group them under major headings and thus examine the 
variations on each theme. 
A. Pro Recognition 
1. The outdated disincentive 
One justification for the old basis of non-recognition was to 
provide a disincentive to illicit and "immoral" relationships. 
75 However, as Finlay points out unmarried cohabitation is now 
accepted in many quarters and, at the least, tolerated in many 
" 
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others. The rationale is that if you can no longer prevent something 
by judicial action why bother to go through the motions and inevitably 
harm some people in the procP.ss. 
On the other hand it could be argued that even nominal 
disapproval of the extra legal relationship is important because 
there are still people who will avoid bringing down the stigma on 
their heads . Also, it might be claimed it is the duty of the law 
to be seen to disapprove institutions outside its bounds, even if the 
preventive effect is minimal. However, these counter claims do not 
override Finlay's basic point that de facto relationships are here 
76 
to stay and that no attitude the judiciary/legislature convey 
about them will cause their decline. 
2. Moving with the times 
A second justification closely related to the first is the 
need for the law to reflect the standards of the time. While it is 
fair to say that the legal shunning of de facto rights a hundred or 
even twenty years ago was in keeping with society's values, nowadays 
77 it is quite simply out of touch. Cretray suggests that there is 
no adequate regime for what has become an institution, but is 
cautious to conclude trat this is justification in itself for legal 
recognition. Finlay goes further in claiming that once the buffer 
of public immorality has vanished the law is obliged to move with it. 
Bailey
78 
takes a similar stance to Finlay emphasising the injustice 
to the de facto parties if the law does not adapt . 
It could of course be claimed that the law is inmutable 
on some points and that it cannot change to suit those who step 
outside of it, no matter how widespread such rebellion is. It 
could be pointed out that if half the population decide rape, pillage 
and murder is good Sunday afternoon entertainment, it would be no 
justification for the law to accommodate their needs. Yet this is 
basically a moral argument and is fully answered in the anti-
recognition section. 
" 
3 
-24-
3. Individual Justice 
The very basis of this argument is that no matter how much 
one theorizes upon the rights and wrongs, there are people out there 
79 who suffer injustices because there is no law to protect them. 
No one denies that legal protection devices such as the exprss 
80 contract do exist but as Weyrauch points out the contract is only 
a viable choice for the middle class, highly educated, and self-
assertive. What do those with less bargaining power do? It follows 
that they are at the mercy of judicial discretion, which is not an 
ogre in itself. Yet often because of technical difficulties in 
fitting a fact situation into an appropriate remedy, individuals 
suffer a hard time. Surely this is not a desirable situation in 
itself, but especially not when one suspects that the disadvantaged 
group are predominantly female, poorly educated and without financial 
means? If the law inadvertantly becomes an instrument of oppression 
against groups enduring disadvantages in other spheres of life as 
well, something is badly wrong . Any counter to the effect that the 
letter of the law is supreme and cannot be held responsible for the 
plight of minority groups, is unrealistic and inhumane. 
4. The rights of children 
It should be remembered that in a significant number of 
de facto relationships children are a by-product and as such any 
denial of aid to parent(s) may directly affect the children's 
upbringing and living standard. Oliver states that recognition 
would be public acknowledgement of the fact that de facto families 
with children are "no less socially functioning families for all 
that and they are performing one of the most vital social functions 
rearing children. 1181 She fears that the denial of recognition 
impedes them in this function, not only financially, but by lowering 
their social status. 
Does this mean that increased recognition should only be 
granted to these relationships with children? While that 
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tended to be the view of Susan Oliver, it is submitted that once 
the law extends itself into these situations it would be a natural 
extension to gradually extend this through to childless couples. 
Basically it is a question of definition. If it is accepted that 
legal recognition for some unmarried couples is necessary, how those 
couples are defined is a secondary matter. 
5. The role of the state 
Finlay sees the policy of recognition as part of the 
broader theme of the role of the welfare state. Laissez-faire 
he claims is dead. The philosophy of the welfare state is to 
assume a duty to interfere in private relationships in order to 
save individuals from themselves and others. This is basically a 
counter attack to the suggestion that people who refrain from marriage 
must have done so because they wished to remain outside the reach 
of the law. It could also be added that in New Zealand the law 
already sees fit to alter or strike down contracts under the 
. 82 Matrimonial Property regime, as well as examining the everyday 
commercial contracts with its doctrines, of inequality of bargaining 
power, duress, unconscionability and so forth. In other words 
if the law can in other circumstances ignore the actual intention of 
parties why should there be an outcry if de facto intention is 
similarly dealt with? Besides, it is not as if de facto relationships 
82A are at present immune from legal intervention. 
A further argument against recognition has always been 
the extra financial burden which would be placed on the welfare state. 
The first answer to this is that human considerations always out-
weigh the financial, and if money must come from somewhere, why not 
cancel orders for new warfare equipment or government limousines? 
It is, afterall, a matter of priorities . However, for those who 
are worried about the extra expenditure, MacDougall points out that 
if certain laws (i.e. maintenance) were fully extended to de facto 
spouses some burden would be taken from the state and placed on the 
individual properly responsible. 
83 
Naturally this only applies to 
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limited areas, and extension of recognition would inevitably result 
in the state having to pay out additional benefits. 
6. Anomalies in law 
84 Cretney puts forwards the proposition that without proper 
recognition of de facto relationships anomalies arise. Unless 
there is no recognition altogether (which is not the case in New 
Zealand) there is a situation where unmarried couples are included 
in some statutes but not in others. Although Cretney wrote about 
the British situation his point is just as relevant to New Zealand. 
For a clear example consider the law that allows the domestic 
purposes benefit to be withdrawn from a woman who lives with a man 
as if they have entered into a marriage relationship, yet denies that 
some woman receipt of the major part of his estate if he dies intestate. 
(For full discussion, see chapter II). 
Is not the elimination of anomalies a worthwhile target? 
7. Impediments to marriage 
As was pointed out in'argument 5' the manifestation of 
intention to avoid legal intervention is often seen in the formation 
of a de facto relationship. However, there are cases where a couple 
simply cannot marry because of a previous marriage(s) or where they 
view their relationship as a prelude to marriage i.e. on a permanent 
basis. In other words, if an unmarried couple have formed the intent-
ion to create a relationship as binding as marriage, or are even 
indifferent to the prospect of legal intervention, why should some 
presumption against intervention be applied in their favour? 
8. Recognition as a virtual punishment 
Although it is a peculiar justification for the recognition 
of de facto rights, Zuckerman tentatively suggests that if a 
couple hold themselves out to be married they deserve the obligations 
85 as well as the "perks" of such a status. Put in less vindictive 
" 
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terms it is based on the fact that the married status has disadvant-
ages such as less superannuation than for two single people, higher 
maintenance obligations etc. It means that unmarried couples do 
not just get protection of their property rights but all the 
responsibilities that go with it. To deny them recognition at all 
or grant only partial recognition may bring about the situation where 
they got too many advantages as opposed to disadvantages. While the 
rationale is similar to that which abhors anomalies in law this has 
the additional justification that it is the holding out that warrants 
the responsibilities not a desire for uniformity in law. 
B. Anti Recognition 
1. Party intention 
Perhaps the major argument against legal recognition 
of de facto rights is to contend that the absence of marriage is 
indicative of a desire to avoid the legal consequences of such a 
status. Zuckerman, Weyrauch, Finlay and Cretney all put this 
point forward. It should also be noted that the 1977 Australian 
Royal Commission on Human Relationships made the following point:
86 
if parties refrain from marrying because 
they do not want to incur the legal and 
financial obligations of marriage then 
the law should be slow to impose these 
obligations on them. 
This raises three issues. Firstly, can there be a general presumption 
that because a couple has not married it is a calculated move to 
avod legal intervention?Secondly even if such a presumption is 
accurate in the majority of cases can it be a justification for an 
across the board rule? Finally, even if party intention is clearly 
to avoid legal consequences in a certain case, does that mean the 
law has no duty to intervene even if there could be gross injustice 
on the facts? 
I ' 
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Ruth Deech
87 
discusses this type of rationalisation of 
intervention. As to the first question, she claims that nowadays 
with divorce easily available "nearly everyone can free himself or 
herself to marry 
88 
She catalogues the major reasons for not 
marrying. There are those experimenting with a trial period of 
living together to test compatibility. There are those retaining 
benefits such as maintenance or single social security benefits. 
Another group reject the legal incidents of marriage, such as commun-
ity property along with the ritualistic elements. She feels that 
women in particular may wish to avoid marriage because they see it 
as a male dominated institution which limits female independence. 
She acknowledges the existence of those who hold themselves out as 
being married but claims that even they have different expectations 
and are aware of their "illicit status." While all her examples 
are valid it is submitted that she credits the average person with 
a degree of forethought that in many cases is not present. People 
tend to drift into relationships guided by their emotions and it is only 
afterwards that they analyse what their expectations were. She also 
89 ignores certain minority cultures where the formal legal ceremony 
may not be customary but the relationship is nevertheless considered 
both permanent and binding. 
While it is fair to say that many couples who do not marry 
are motivated by a desire to avoid its restrictions it is submitted 
that this cannot justify imputing such motives to all de facto 
relationships. There remain individuals who gave no thought to the 
matter and rather than ignore their rights because of majority motive 
reasoning, would it not be more reasonable to remain open minded 
(i.e. at least build some sort of intention test into the original 
definition). 
Finally, even in those cases where partyintention was 
clearly to avoid restrictions, can that be the sole deciding factor? 
Deech claims that once intention is established the argument ends . 
She claims to do otherwise would be ''to deny the freedom to try 
" 
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alternative forms of a relationship. 1190 She goes as far as to 
suggest that it contravenes the European Convention on Human Rights.
91 
While this may be true to a limited extent it is submitted that 
inevitably a choice must be made between the lesser of two evils. 
Should the right to act to personal or more importantly someone 
else's detriment be preserved, or should freedom of intention 
ultimately give way to individual justice on the facts? (The 
writer's opinion has already been stated in argument 5 of justificat-
ion for recognition). 
2. Problems of definition 
Once again nearly all the writers in this area raise the 
initial point of the difficulty in defining which relationships 
are to be included or excluded from legal recognition. However, it 
is the opinion of the writer that this does not deserve to rate as 
a justification for denying recognition. The courts have never, 
in the past, refused to decide a point of law simply because the 
fa c ts were too difficult to establish. Experts are called upon to 
classify the facts,and in such a way would a definition be drafted 
in accordance with informed opinion as to the appropriate qualifi-
cations . Obviously it would not cover all contingencies, but that is 
no excuse for not making the attempt at all. 
Of more weight are the arguments that the inclusion of 
heterosexual de facto rights in law would only produce further 
92 anomalies in law. As Deech states what becomes of brother and 
sister partnerships, homosexual unions and those other unions 
forbidden by law to marry (i.e. polygymous or polyandrous groups)? 
She claims that if heterosexual unions are singled out women cohabi -
tants will be put on the level of long term prostitutes '~ith 
d 1 d b · b · · " 9 J Th 1 h . . f . e aye payment su Ject to ar itration. e on y ot er Justi i-
cation she finds for this limit is the presence of children, but 
then counters that this should apply to all unions, lawful or not, 
if children are present. 
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There are obvious replies to her points. Firstly 
cohabitation is viewed as "long term prostitution" for the woman, 
is not marriage merely a legally institutionalised version of the 
same thing? Secondly, instead of seeing justification to limit one 
group's rights by highlighting another group 's lesser rights, why 
not take up the cause of both for the better rather than seek 
consistent injustice? A more conservative solution is that no 
union which cannot acquire legal rights by marriage should be able 
to do so by cohabitation, This explains the f -"' ~.- .. cl position 
of the hei ~r~ sexual de facto union quite simply.
94 
3. Competing claims 
Cretney maintains that widespread recognition of de facto 
rights could possibly "involve introducing polygamy into English 
law, 1195 In other words there will often be the situation where a 
man, for example, will have or have had relationships with two women 
(one his legal and one his de facto wife) and yet both will be 
treated in law as a wife . Whose claim has priority? 
Public morality would tend to go on the side of the 
wife's claim. However, MacDougall envisages a wide divergence in 
judicial practireaccording to individual circumstances. Without 
going into detail of the decisions in the competitive rights area, 
it is enough to acknowledge that a difficulty exists. Deech claims 
these issues need clarification before recognising unmarried 
cohabitants in law. It is the opinion of the writer that once the 
decision has been made to extend or implement de facto rights, 
introduction should be immediate, Problems such as these should 
either be legislated for (they are already taken account of in 
New Zealand maintenance law
96
) or tackled as they arise. Once more 
this is a difficulty that emerges from the increased legal recognition, 
but not a justification, it itself, for denying it . 
4 . The role of women 
Deech, particularly, is adamant that in a time when most 
" 
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women are building social and financial independence, women should 
not be encouraged to take advantage of a legal system that 
stereotypes them as the weaker partner needing protection of the court 
against exploitation. She challenges the assumption that women are 
struggling to free themselves from an exploitation that involved 
undervaluing of their domestic skills, handicaps in employment and 
denial of education, and as such should receive a finacial share of 
assets on break up as compensation or rehabilitation resources. She 
would rather women gain equal status by shouldering equal responsibi-
lity. She stresses the advantage of comfortable life style that the 
housewife's "exploitation" brought in return, "a privileged person".., 
she calls it 1 In effect,
97 
she criticizes the regime applying to 
married women and uses this as justification for denying an unmarried 
woman the same protection. Of cohabitation, she writes: 
Unfortunately, 
Is it not more true to say that cohabitation 
(and marriage), far from being a situation 
of detriment, is a benefit to women, and to 
men, chosen freely, for more pleasent and 
rewarding financially than the single life, 
and needing no restoration of lost opport-
unities at its termination. 9 8 
'°'et all relationships areArun along the middle class 
dream prototype that she describes? Firstly, she criticizes the 
tradional marriage-like situation and demands that unmarried women 
should not be encouraged to live and capitalise on it. However, 
rather than admit that the lifestyle is damaging to women she 
concludes what a cosy (if undesirable) little life it is, anyway. 
While there is merit in the proposition that women should be en -
couraged to be self-supportive, it does not follow that this will 
be achieved by denying the rights to de facto women that their 
married counterparts already have. She must withdraw those legal 
remedies from them as well, which is a topic in itself. Her second 
point of the undesired lifestyle being too advantageous to merit 
post break up remedy (she tends to talk in terms of property/ 
maintenance rights) is impractical, it is submitted. People do 
not always plan their lives and relationships all that neatly. 
" 
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Unwanted children arrive, wives are physically and emotionally 
battered so as to be unable to immediately resume normal lives. 
Flourishing careers are sacrificed to the traditional role, and 
"the opportunity, if she takes it, to continue her education or 
pursue her hobbies 1199 is a pipe-dream when one has several children 
under school age, no basic education to initiate contacts, diminished 
self-confidence or even a part-time factory job. Too often survival, 
not middle class social antics, is the name of game. As such, it 
is the opinion of the writer that the remedies and protections 
already provided to married women are both necessary and desirable 
and thus would be of benefit to unmarried women. Possibly it does 
not provide women with incentive to be fully self-supportive but at 
least it gives them a chance to get on their feet, first. Maybe 
then they can fight the greater battle. 
So far this section has assumed that women are the ones 
requiring the protection. Although it is admitted that in certain 
cases it may be the male who is disadvantaged, it is nevertheless 
the opinion of the writer that it is women generally who, are at 
100 the disadvantage. As Honore points out, uthe husband 
generally earns the family living, and, on the whole, the more he 
earns, the more he makes the important decisions." If he makes the 
decisions chances are that property is in his name. BesidesJnothing 
can change the basic fact that women bear children and as such, it 
is they who generally rear the~, sacrificing work experience, earn-
ing power, social conta ct etc. It is to be wished that it were 
otherwise . 
5. Devaluation of marriage 
The Royal Commission on Human Relationships emphasised 
the point that any extension of de facto rights should be 
framed so as not to be a disincentive to marriage. In this view 
they are joined by writers such Cretney and MacDougall. 
Bailey however, feels that marriage is not devalued by bettering 
the lot of the unmarried. There is more to marriage than the benefits 
it confers and it is the opinion of the writer that enough people 
" 
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value marriage for religious, ethical, moral or sentimental reasons 
for it always to be a popular alternative to cohabiting without 
legal sanction. It is worth remembering, however, that many people 
as a matter of princeiple would wish the law to give official 
preference to what they believe is the proper institution. 
6. Moral repugnance 
Although people are probably more tolerant "of unwedded 
bliss•" than in the past. There are still those who would claim 
that it is immoral to "live in sin" and that people do not acquire 
rights until they do the "decent thing" and marry. A typical 
example of this attitude is expressed by Samuels when she writes 
that "if people wish to have the privileges and advantages and 
protections of marriage then they should enter into that status 
d h . h . b . 1 . . l O l Th h an assume t e in erent responsi i ities. ere is noting 
to be said about such views except that it is doubtful whether 
it is the role of law to enforce such moral judgments (even though 
they masquerade as the views of "right minded members of society"). 
While it is admitted that there are worthwhile considerations 
on both sides, it is nevertheless the opinion of the writer that the 
humanitarian considerations of people in need must inevitably 
outweigh the disadvantages of denying party intention with its 
associated difficulties of definition, conflict of rights, and 
increased financial burden on the state. 
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LAW REFORM - A CONCLUSION ON THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF DE 
FACTO RELATIONSHIPS 
A. The Definitive Ramifications of Recognition 
So far the moral, social, financial and practical 
ramifications of recognising de facto relationships have been examined. 
However, it still remains to discuss what recognition will mean in 
terms of the definition of the two life styles of cohabitation and 
marriage themselves. There can be no doubt that marriage is an 
institution unique in the commitment it involves and the 
obligations it imposes. If cohabitation were to be formalised to 
the same extent one either loses the opportunity to lead a less 
r egimented life style, thus extending the boundaries of marriage, 
or marriage itself becomes "de specialised" to the extent that all 
relationships become cohabitation agreements with varying degrees of 
formality involved . Therefore, in deciding whether not to recognise 
de facto relationships at all, or to a partial or full marriage-
like extent one must take these considerations into account. 
Much has been written of a world wide trend to 
simultaneously attach increasing legal consequences to cohabitation 
while making marriage less rigid. The effect is to create a virtual 
assimilation of the two institutions somewhere in the middle. 
102 Glendon describes this phenomenon in three countries . In France 
she claims that the de facto relationship is now so legalised that 
it closely resembles marriage, an example of cohabitation being 
assimilated into marriage. In Sweden she describes the emergence 
of "informal marriage" as a social and legal institution (i.e. their 
matrimonial property regime equally applies to certain unmarried 
couples) while within marriage there is the demise of many 
distinguishable features of its formal nature. (i . e . no alimony 
on marriage break up) . This is a clear example of the two 
institutions meeting in the middle. Finally she claims that the 
United States are so liberal in labelling de facto relationships 
as "common law" marriages that cohabitation is moving closer to 
" 
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marriage in terms of formality. Finlay explains the trend in terms 
of marriage having to de formalise to ensure its own survival. 
He claims that if divorce, for example, had not been made more 
readily available marriage would eventually have been by passed 
in favour of cohabitation . The extended recognition of de facto 
relationships is perhaps more obviously explained by the need to 
standardise the protection that is inevitably required when two 
people have a relationship resembling marriage. 
Inevitably, when considering what degree of legal protection 
to grant de fact relationships, one must ask what is the desirable 
relationship between the two? Blake
103 
in an argument for the 
minimisation of legal consequences in all spheres of life suggests 
that the law should look to making marriage more like cohabitation 
in that every couple should be encouraged to regulate their own 
relationship by agreement with the courts only intervening in the 
event of fraud, unfair pressure or other unacceptable behaviour. 
While Pear1
104 
takes the same view as Blake, Finlay believes that 
it is cohabitation that has to be formalised if individuals are to 
receive the greater protection that marriage provides. Bailey also 
views legal recognition for de facto couples in terms of regulating 
their rights further in accordance with the marriage model. It is 
also the opinion of the writer that the legal recognition of de 
facto relationships must be implemented by bringing them closer to 
the formality of marriage. However, it must be emphasised that the 
consequences should never be exactly equivalent to marriage. In 
order to maintain some freedom in determining how to run one 's own 
domestic arrangements a choice of degree of formality must be 
available . To bring the two lifestyles totally together only serves 
to devalue the inherent advantages of each . Honore sums the 
situation up when he claims that "so long as marriage is the central 
institution of our society it will be necessary to have some 
differential between married and unmarried couples . But it need not be 
a wide one . " 
" 
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B. Areas and Regimes of Reform 
As it is the submission of this paper that de facto 
relatinships should only be recognized to a partial extent i.e. 
a degree less than marriage, it becomes a question of which 
aspects of New Zealand law warrant de facto inclusion and which 
do not. First of all it should be acknowledged that New Zealand 
does, in fact, recognize de facto relationships to a limited extent. 
(See chapter II). However, it is submitted that this is still not 
sufficient. The major areas of deficiency are de facto rights on 
the death of the other spouse and at the end of the relationship. 
Although uncertain, the possible exclusion of de facto couples from 
the fundamental rights the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 has to 
offer, is also unacceptable. 
taken 
While property rights are a major concern this is not to be 
as meaning that other areas such as the denial of a 
molestation order in the area of domestic violence, or even the lack 
of facilities for conciliation/counselling in the Family Court 
structure, are not also suitable areas for reform. The list in 
fact goes on and on, however, it is the opinion of the writer that 
property rights are the fundamental area for reform as they 
affect so many de facto couples, as do the basic protections from 
everyday discrimination that the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 
provides. Once a move has been made in the granting of de facto 
rights, the scope of reform should be made easier gradually covering 
all areas of deficiency. 
Once an aim is formulated what is the most appropriate 
regime to cover the deficiency? What is being asked is not whether 
protection should be embodied in statute or left to judicial dis-
cretion, but whether the protection should take the form of 
extending already existing marriage regimes to de facto couples or 
creating totally new rights and obligations, unique to the de 
facto relationship. In the area of ensuring fair treatment from 
third parties it is submitted that the obvious solution is to merely 
3 
-37-
include certain de facto parties within existing rights. For example, 
"de facto marriage" can be reinserted in the Human Rights Commission 
Act 1977, as well as being inserted as to be read as included in 
marriage, husband or wife etcetera in other statutes conferring 
financial benefits, 
The area of difficulty is regulating the legal rights 
between de facto parties. 
1. Extending existing law 
In regard to de facto property division on death it is 
submitted that to formulate a regime of rights independent from 
the Administration Act 1969 or the Family Protection Act 1955 would 
be to cause unnecessary confusion in the law. The most appropriate 
solution would surely be to allow "spouse" in both Acts to include 
a de facto spouse if certain conditions were met such as no 
competition with a legal spouse and perhaps a certain number of 
years spent in that capacity . 
De facto property division on the termination of the relation-
ship fits less easily into existing law. If a certain class of 
de facto spouse were allowed to apply for division "under the 
Matrimonial Property Act 1976 there would perhaps have to be a 
right of the court to dismiss an application if it were thought 
105 unjust to apply. However, the drawback is that so long as de 
facto couples are offered a discretionary form of married rights 
there is too much scope for the judiciary to exclude certain cases 
as inappropriate (even although they have passed the "definition 
test"), forcing recourse, once again, to the piecemeal remedies 
of equity and common law. 
2 . An independent regime 
While an independent regime is unnecessary for property 
division on death, it may well be the solution at the termination 
106 of the relationship. The "homemakers grievance" that Deech outlines 
b . Sh . 107 may not e inappropriate. e writes 
" 
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By providing the services and in consequence 
not going out to work (or by working part time 
only) the claimant has sacrificed the opport-
unity to use his/her wages in the acquisition 
of savings or capital assets and has lost 
value and seniority on the labour market and 
should be compensated for this sacrifice. 
By adopting this type of scheme or even another loosely based on 
the matrimonial property regime (perhaps a lesser presumption 
than e qual sharing but considerable emphasis on non-financial 
contribution which would give the non-earner property rights in 
the assets (s)he failed to acquire (financially speaking) while 
keeping house, rearing children etc. Rather than Deech's compen -
sation for assets not acquired, recognition that the assets were, 
in fact, acquired by joint efforts) the problem of whether to 
include a judicial prerogative to exclude such relationships as is 
seen fit from existing law is avoided. Once a definition is 
formulated a de facto couple would have their property disputes 
dealt with consistently and with a high degree of certainty. 
3. Encouragement of self-help 
It is often advocated that instead of the law interven-
int in de facto relationships, these couples should be encouraged 
to regulate their own lives by making contracts which the 
judiciary would be obliged to uphold except in extreme 
circumstances. 
108 
Such a solution could work for property 
division on death or break up, yet there are many inherent snags 
in contract law which would work against it (fully discussed later 
in the chapter) the greatest being the emotional link in these 
circumstances between the contracting parties. Contract require 
objective consideration and careful planning and it is doubted 
whether most couples could be persuaded to exercise this degree of 
fprethough t, or having done so, disregard their current feelings 
for their spouse. 
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c. Definition 
Regardless of what regime is to be applied,or how it will be 
effected (to be discussed in the following section) a decision must 
be reached about which couples should be included in the recognition. 
In chapter II the problem was introduced as a weighing up of the 
need for certainty and consistency without standardising the test 
so as to exclude deserving cases. Excluding definitions offered 
by the judiciary (see chapter II), the following is a list of factors 
that have either been embodied in statute or suggested as appropriate 
by various writers: 
1 bl . . 109 , pu ic reputation, 
2 . . f h . 110 . intention o t e parties, 
3. cohabitation (as opposed to the "mistress" situation lll where parties do not actually set up home together), 
4. length of the relationship,
112 
5. birth of children, 
113 
6 d b · 1 · 114 . permanence an sta i ity, 
7. 
8. 
9. 
115 involvement or otherwise of legal spouse, 
1 . d d 116 mutua inter epen ence, 
117 evidence of support by one party, and 
10. whether the relationship can acquire legal status by marriage (i.e. means of excluding homosexual, incestuous, and minor relationships). 118 
It is the opinion of the writer that these suggestions 
range from completely inappropriate in any context, to appropriate 
in certain contexts, and finally to a necessary prerequisite in a 
general definition. For example, public reputation is too broad and 
too hard to e stablish legally as well as often being something apart 
from the actual nature of the relationship itself. If a couple 
choose to adopt the same name and pretend to the world that they are 
married, this proves little about the nature of their relationship 
except that they are sensitive to public censure. Evidence of support 
is inappropriate to most areas except in regard to a decision 
whether to withdraw a "singles" benefit or whether spousal main-
tenance might be appropr:ia te. As a general requirement it is based 
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on a concept of marriage that assumes the female is the dependent 
weaker partner . While, unfortunately, the stereotype may still hold 
some truthJit should in no way be encouraged by the necessity of an 
unmarried couple having to prove such a relationship to qualify as 
"d e facto". Similarly the birth of children is irrelevant as a major 
definitive factor. No one has ever claimed that a childless married 
couple was in any way any less a "married couple" because of the 
absence of children . The birth of children is irrelevant to all 
except maintenance questions as it is all too often an accidental 
occurence, anyway, not proof of permanence and stability. Besides 
if they are viewed as the sole justification for the legal recognition 
of their parents, the rights of the couple itself is ignored. Similarly, 
the existence of a legal spouse should have no prima facie relevance 
unless the definition concerns the property division on death, or 
in some cases the termination of a de facto relationship (i.e. where 
one party is already married). On the other hand, intention of the 
parties, cohabitation, length of the relationship, and potential legal 
status are all possibilities in drafting a general definition. 
It is the conclusion of this paper that a general "all 
purposes" definition of "d e facto relationship" is required, which 
would have the effect of the South Australian " putative spouse", 
that is to say specific statutes could deem it to apply wherever 
"marriage", "husband" "wife" et cetera was referred to . In addition, 
to cater for the needs of specific areas of law, more specific 
definitions are required, which may raise or lower the inclusion 
standard of the general definition. On this basis the writer has 
tentatively drafted the following provisions: 
1. The general definition 
The relevant factors should be cohabitation under the 
same roof, (although not necessarily absolutely continuous), length of 
the relationship, permanence and stability coupled with mutual 
interdependence, and a requirement that the relationship be able to 
be legalised by marriage (until the law allows homosexual couples 
to marry it would be inconsistent to grant greater rights for 
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cohab itation. Besides the common law and equitable remedies are still 
available to these illicit couples). Party intention is also a 
possibility . Rather than have a rigid list of qualifications the 
B 'l . f 1 . h 119 h b d d ai ey suggestion o an a ternatives sc eme as een a opte . She 
views i t as the fairest way to overcome the danger of a too restrictive 
120 
definition . Her example is to fix a minimum time period, but 
if this was not met "a real financ i al hardship . • o suffered by one or 
both parties if the law could not effect a readjustment between the~' 
could suffice. The writer would further amend this by offering two 
alternatives . The definition would read: 
2. 
(a) A person is, on a certain date, the de facto 
spouse of that other person if, on that date, 
(s)he cohabits under the same roof with that 
person in a relationship of stability and 
mutual interdependence, and that relationship 
could at some time in the future acquire legal 
status by marriage, and 
(b) (i) (s)he has so cohabitated with that other 
person continuously (i . e . has not at any time 
been apart for more than three months) for a 
period of not less than two years immediately 
preceding that date , or 
(ii) an intention has been formed to create 
a permanent long term relationship and real 
hardship would be suffered by one party if 
the law does not a ffect a readjustment 
between them 
Specific definitions 
Because certain rights in law involve specialised 
circumstances the following is a suggested list of adaptations to 
the general definition that could be made: 
(a) Property rights on death of the de facto spouse 
''Spouse includes any person within the general definition 
(substitute here the appropriate enacting provision) so long as no 
entitlement of a de facto spouse shall in anyway limit the valid 
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right of a legal spouse to receive an equitable share of the estate. 
This phrasing is intended to provide for a compromise share 
if necessary between the two "spouses", not just an automatic 
presumption in favour of the legal spouse . 
(b) Denial of benefits (i.e. sickness benefit, D. P.B.) 
,, 
Spouse includes any person within the general definition 
(a) (substitute enacting provision) and 
(c) it can be proved that the beneficiary is financially supported 
to a substantial extent in household costs by that spouse. ·• 
This entails waiving the time period or intention of 
permanence requirements in favour of a support requirement, which 
should, afterall, be the major consideration in the revocation of 
a benefit. 
(c) Maintenance (spousal, of equivalence to Part VI 
Family Proceedings Act 1980) 
1/Spouse includes any person within the general definition 
(a) (substitute enacting provision) but if neither (b)(i) or 
(b)(ii) is applicable that person shall not be excluded if 
(c) (s)he has had sexual relationships with that other person 
resulting in the birth of at least one child." 
(d) De facto for the purposes of the Human Rights 
Commission Act 1977 or some similar protective 
measure 
Because of the basic nature of these rights and the fact 
that discrimination could be levelled against almost any couple 
who live together, it is submitted that even the general definition is 
too rigid and should be waived in favour of a simple: 
De facto marriage applies to any two persons 
of opposite sexes who cohabit under the same 
roof in a relationship of a sexual and domes-
tic nature. 
" 
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In conclusion, therefore, it is submitted that apart from 
these specialised definitions (not to be read as an exhaustive list) 
the general definition is appropriate to most other areas of law, 
especially property division on the termination of the relationship. 
D. The Means of Reform 
The final step once selected areas of law are chosen for 
reform, it has been decided what form that recognition should take 
and a definition has been formulated, is to embody the recognition 
in law. Basically it is a choice of statute, express contract or 
common law and equitable remedies such as trust, implied contract 
and estoppal, which are subject to judicial discretion. 
L Common law and equity 
The advantage of the piecemeal remedies is that they allow 
justice to be done if the court thinks the case is deserving. In 
other words there is no problem of framing a strict definition when 
it is never necessary to label a relationship to apply the remedy. 
In terms of the remedy itself it means that the court can apply 
whatever division, amount of maintenance, succession right it feels 
appropriate to the case . However, the major pitfall is, of course, 
the lack of consistency, certainty and the fact that in many cases 
the implied contract, trust or whatever is a none too carefully 
concealed fiction. Overall, it is submitted that as the major 
preserve of de facto rights it is unsatisfactory and should only be 
the recourse for those who cannot include themselves within a more 
formalised framework (i.e. those outside the de facto definition 
such as the homosexual couple) . 
2. Express contract 
Unless there was mass public edu ~ation promoting the 
regulation of one's de facto relationship by contract, it would simply 
not apply in enough cases . As was pointed out in chapter II those 
who do avail themselves of it tend to be an elitist group. Bailey is 
" 
3 
-44-
concerned that contract provides too much scope for exploitation 
and reasons that if the law sees fit to interfere in married contracts 
121 there is no excuse to do otherwise with cohabitation contracts. 122 
Vaver on the other hand favours the idea, claiming that they 
provide "for the spiritual benefit of the relationship by providing 
for consciousness raising, discussing the division of roles, and 
providing for conciliation in the event of dispute" as well as 
settling property division. Nevertheless it is the opinion of the 
writer that as the sole source of protection in a given area 
(i.e. property division in a broken down relationship) it is hope-
lessly inadequate even with the back up of common law and equity . 
Yet, in tandem with statutory measures (i.e , either inclusion in 
existing law or a separate statutory property division regime) it 
could provide a worthwhile means of contracting further in or out 
of the statutory super structure (so long as there were safeguards 
to strike down unjust agreements). 
3. Statute 
If a definition of "d e facto" is to exist it must be 
embodied in statute , Against statutory law is its rigidity, yet it, 
more than any other form of recognition provides consistency and 
certainty. It is also submitted, that whether it is decided to 
incorporate de facto recognition in existing law or formulate an 
independent system, it is nevertheless necessary to ensure that the 
remedy is in statute. It has been claimed that this form of recog-
nition, more than any other, diminishes the distinction between 
marriage and cohabitation (i.e. no longer statutory protection for 
marriage and piecemeal remedies for the unmarried). Perhaps this is 
so, yet what does the theory of institutions or scruples about the 
granting of official approval matter so long as just solution in the 
resolution of their problems is available to a greater number of 
people? As it is the courts will be involved in the resolution of ) 
terminology of disputes that invariably arise out of statute, and 
it is at this level that societal values will shape de facto law 
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into its own unique form. It is this very combination of judicially 
interpreted legislation that will hopefully provide something 
nearer the appropriate balance of arbitrary and discretionary remedy 
that de facto relationships lack in present law . 
" 
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